Analysis of a Malicious Loader Disguised as a WinRAR Installer
To thoroughly analyze a malicious-loader-to-remote-control-backdoor chain disguised as a WinRAR installer, analysts drove AVL Code with a single natural-language instruction, closing the loop from malicious sample to a complete analysis report.
Built with AVL Code + the Landi model
Overview
Facing a PE32 malicious loader packed with Setup Factory and disguised as the official WinRAR installer, analysts drove AVL Code with one natural-language instruction to reverse-engineer it in depth: untangling the dual-layer scheduled-task persistence chain built from three dropped BAT scripts — a one-shot launcher (once.bat), a 5-minute recurring trigger (connectionupdate2.bat), and the core payload (connectionupdate.bat) that adds a Defender exclusion, hijacks the hosts file, and downloads a backdoor — reconstructing the full attack chain from four hijacked-domain hosts entries through to a memory-only PowerShell RAT backdoor (a.ps1) that polls its C2 every 5 seconds, binds to a device UID, and executes arbitrary commands. In about 3 minutes it produced a report with a complete IOC list, an attack-chain timeline, and a removal plan, classified as Critical.
Key results
- Fully reverse-engineered the PE32 malicious loader disguised as a WinRAR installer, identifying its Setup Factory packing and three-stage BAT-script drop chain
- Reconstructed the dual-layer scheduled-task persistence mechanism — once.bat creates a startup task then self-deletes; connectionupdate2.bat creates a 5-minute recurring task to keep the core payload running
- Identified hosts-file hijacking (4 hijacked domain entries) and a memory-resident PowerShell RAT backdoor, a.ps1 (polls its C2 every 5 seconds, binds to a device UID, executes arbitrary commands)
- Extracted a complete IOC list (5 file hashes, 2 C2 addresses, 4 hijacked domains, 2 scheduled-task names, 2 registry paths), producing an attack-chain timeline and removal plan in about 3 minutes, classified as Critical
Technical highlights
Practical value
Helps security operations teams rapidly identify and respond to remote-control trojan threats, provides end-to-end guidance from detection to removal, strengthens detection and handling of disguised loaders and fileless attacks, and effectively protects Windows system security.
Artifacts
Session replays & reports are original records in Simplified Chinese · Built with AVL Code + the Landi model
